May 30, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. XLVIII / Cienta
March 16.- Instructed Lieutenant Colonel McCaskey, commanding Twentieth
U. S. Infantry, at Pasig, to clear the country in his immediate
vicinity of any of the insurgents who might be lurking near, and soon
after received a dispatch from him that he had sent out two battalions
to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon
after, heavy and long-continued firing was heard to the east and north
of Pasig. At 12 M. learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding
Third Battalion Twentieth U. S. Infantry, had come upon the enemy,
intrenched one thousand strong at the village of Cienta, and that he
had carried the intrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in
the direction of Taytay.
Title: The official records of the Oregon volunteers in the Spanish
war and Philippine insurrection,page 547
U. S. Infantry, at Pasig, to clear the country in his immediate
vicinity of any of the insurgents who might be lurking near, and soon
after received a dispatch from him that he had sent out two battalions
to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon
after, heavy and long-continued firing was heard to the east and north
of Pasig. At 12 M. learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding
Third Battalion Twentieth U. S. Infantry, had come upon the enemy,
intrenched one thousand strong at the village of Cienta, and that he
had carried the intrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in
the direction of Taytay.
Title: The official records of the Oregon volunteers in the Spanish
war and Philippine insurrection,page 547
American fury in the Philippines. XLVII / Tondo
Report of Capt. R. E. Davis, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer Infantry,
of Pursuit of Insurgents in Tondo, February 23, 1899.
MANILA, P. I., February 24, 1899.
Maj. PERCY WILLIS,
Commanding Second Battalion, Oregon U. S. V.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of my company's
actions during the skirmish and advance to Caloocan from Tondo,
February 23, 1899:
After receiving your order to deploy as skirmishers and protect the
left flank of the line, we advanced steadily with short rests for
better fire facilities, using both individual and volley firing, as
position of our line and enemy would permit. We burned all houses in
our rear, after thoroughly examining them, and sent to the rear about
fifty male prisoners. After the last halt on stone bridge I was
ordered to cross the lagoon and advance in skirmish line toward
Caloocan, examining and burning all houses in our front. In carrying
out these instructions we could not find a single stand of arms and
very few knives of any kind, although careful search was made for them.
After reaching the railroad station about two miles north of Tondo we
relieved the Montana company holding the road, and, awaiting your
advance, halted for lunch. Up to this point the country was full of
houses, and we burned them all after sending about one hundred men and
women to the rear. As they were not armed or in resistance and our
force was small we did not put them under arrest.
To sum up events we killed probably about thirty insurgents, as we
counted twenty five in our front while advancing. We sent to the rear
fifty prisoners and burned nearly one hundred houses.
Our total casualties were a slight superficial wound on index finger
of left hand of Martin Hildebrandt. We had a force of fifty men with
Captain Davis and Lieutenant Dunbar in command. I can not speak too
highly of the conduct of the men, as my only difficulty was to hold
them back and prevent unnecessary exposure to fire.
Very respectfully, R. E. DAVIS, Captain, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer
Infantry, Commanding Company E.
May 26, 2008
Rizal as American hero. I
Quien creó la provincia de Rizal? Parece que el gobierno colonial
americano. En 1902 ya hay una mención a ella.
Rizal is a new province containing a portion of the territory formerly
included in the province of Manila.
Title: Civil government for the Philippine Islands. Speech of Hon.
Julius C. Burrows ... in the Senate of the United States Wednesday,
May 28, 1902. page 14
Author: Burrows, Julius C. (Julius Caesar), 1837-1915
americano. En 1902 ya hay una mención a ella.
Rizal is a new province containing a portion of the territory formerly
included in the province of Manila.
Title: Civil government for the Philippine Islands. Speech of Hon.
Julius C. Burrows ... in the Senate of the United States Wednesday,
May 28, 1902. page 14
Author: Burrows, Julius C. (Julius Caesar), 1837-1915
May 25, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. XLVI / Reconcentration
And Mr. Bacon well says:
We are apt to think about the reconcentrado camps simply in connection
with sufferings which may be endured by those within the camps; and,
in the case of the Cuban reconcentrado camps, where there was not
food, then, of course, all the added horrors of that tropical climate
constituted one of the features of the reconcentrado camps. But the
greatest horror and the greatest suffering which are occasioned by the
reconcentrado camps is not the horror and the suffering within the
camp, but the horror and the suffering without the camp. When a
general prescribes a certain limited area within which he says all the
people must congregate, there must be the corresponding direction
which will enforce that order; and the corresponding direction is that
everything outside of those prescribed limits shall be without
protection, and, both as to property and life, be subject to
destruction. Only in that way can people be carried within the limits
of the reconcentrado camps. It is because life is unsafe out of them,
because life is almost certain to be sacrificed out of them, because
all property left outside is to be destroyed, because all houses are
to be burned, because the country is to be made a desert waste,
because within a camp is a zone of life and without the camp a
wide-spread area of death and desolation. That is what a reconcentrado
camp means. Do you suppose if there is an invitation to people to come
within a reconcentrado camp, that they are going to come there unless
they are forced there? Is there any way to force them except to say
that it is death to remain outside? Why, Mr. President, when the
limited area of a reconcentrado camp is prescribed, the people cannot
be collected and driven in there. The soldiers cannot go out and find
them and drive them in as you would a drove of horses. It is only by
putting upon them this order, this pressure of life and death, that
they are made to flee within the limits of the reconcentrado camps to
escape the torch and the sword that destroys all without. When a
general prescribes a reconcentrado camp,- and I am going, before I get
through, to read Bell's order to show that that is what it means,-
when a general prescribes a reconcentrado camp, he practically says
that everybody outside must come inside or die: he practically says to
his soldiers, Those who do not get inside shall be slaughtered; and
the practical operation is that those who do not get inside are
slaughtered.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
We are apt to think about the reconcentrado camps simply in connection
with sufferings which may be endured by those within the camps; and,
in the case of the Cuban reconcentrado camps, where there was not
food, then, of course, all the added horrors of that tropical climate
constituted one of the features of the reconcentrado camps. But the
greatest horror and the greatest suffering which are occasioned by the
reconcentrado camps is not the horror and the suffering within the
camp, but the horror and the suffering without the camp. When a
general prescribes a certain limited area within which he says all the
people must congregate, there must be the corresponding direction
which will enforce that order; and the corresponding direction is that
everything outside of those prescribed limits shall be without
protection, and, both as to property and life, be subject to
destruction. Only in that way can people be carried within the limits
of the reconcentrado camps. It is because life is unsafe out of them,
because life is almost certain to be sacrificed out of them, because
all property left outside is to be destroyed, because all houses are
to be burned, because the country is to be made a desert waste,
because within a camp is a zone of life and without the camp a
wide-spread area of death and desolation. That is what a reconcentrado
camp means. Do you suppose if there is an invitation to people to come
within a reconcentrado camp, that they are going to come there unless
they are forced there? Is there any way to force them except to say
that it is death to remain outside? Why, Mr. President, when the
limited area of a reconcentrado camp is prescribed, the people cannot
be collected and driven in there. The soldiers cannot go out and find
them and drive them in as you would a drove of horses. It is only by
putting upon them this order, this pressure of life and death, that
they are made to flee within the limits of the reconcentrado camps to
escape the torch and the sword that destroys all without. When a
general prescribes a reconcentrado camp,- and I am going, before I get
through, to read Bell's order to show that that is what it means,-
when a general prescribes a reconcentrado camp, he practically says
that everybody outside must come inside or die: he practically says to
his soldiers, Those who do not get inside shall be slaughtered; and
the practical operation is that those who do not get inside are
slaughtered.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XLV / Rape
An anonymous letter signed " An Outraged Citizen" was addressed to
General MacArthur under date of February 26, i9oi, beginning:
It is simply horrible what the Macabebe soldiers are doing in some of
the towns.... The Macabebes are committing the most horrible outrages
in the towns and the officers say nothing, but, on the contrary,
punish and threaten any persons who make complaint.... Some twelve
days ago some Macabebes went into a house, and four soldiers raped a
married woman, one after another, in the presence of her husband, and
threatened to kill him if he dared to say anything. The war will never
come to an end this way, nor will the country be pacified. The people
are compelled to take to the woods.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
General MacArthur under date of February 26, i9oi, beginning:
It is simply horrible what the Macabebe soldiers are doing in some of
the towns.... The Macabebes are committing the most horrible outrages
in the towns and the officers say nothing, but, on the contrary,
punish and threaten any persons who make complaint.... Some twelve
days ago some Macabebes went into a house, and four soldiers raped a
married woman, one after another, in the presence of her husband, and
threatened to kill him if he dared to say anything. The war will never
come to an end this way, nor will the country be pacified. The people
are compelled to take to the woods.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XLIV / Liruan
official report of Major Waller, dated Nov. 23, 1901, from which this
passage is quoted:
On the march to Liruan the second column, fifty men, under Captain
Bearss, in accordance with my orders, destroyed all villages and
houses, burning in all one hundred and sixty-five.
...I wish to work southward a little, destroying all houses and crops,
and, if possible, get the rifles from Balangiga. This plan has been
explained to the general, meeting his approval.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
passage is quoted:
On the march to Liruan the second column, fifty men, under Captain
Bearss, in accordance with my orders, destroyed all villages and
houses, burning in all one hundred and sixty-five.
...I wish to work southward a little, destroying all houses and crops,
and, if possible, get the rifles from Balangiga. This plan has been
explained to the general, meeting his approval.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XLIII / Mass murder
Howard McFarland, sergeant, Company B, Forty-third Infantry, wrote to
the Fairfield Journal of Maine:
- I am now stationed in a small town in charge of twenty-five men,
and have a territory of twenty miles to patrol.... At the best, this
is a very rich country; and we want it. My way of getting it would be
to put a regiment into a skirmish line, and blow every nigger into a
nigger heaven. On Thursday, March 29, eighteen of my company killed
seventy-five nigger bolomen and ten of the nigger gunners.... When we
find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
the Fairfield Journal of Maine:
- I am now stationed in a small town in charge of twenty-five men,
and have a territory of twenty miles to patrol.... At the best, this
is a very rich country; and we want it. My way of getting it would be
to put a regiment into a skirmish line, and blow every nigger into a
nigger heaven. On Thursday, March 29, eighteen of my company killed
seventy-five nigger bolomen and ten of the nigger gunners.... When we
find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XLII / Mass murder
L. F. Adams, of Ozark, Mo., a soldier in the Washington regiment,
describing the scene after the battle of February 4-5, 1899, said:
In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth
Artillery there were 1,oo8 dead niggers, and a great many wounded. We
burned all their houses. I don't know how many men, women, and
children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any prisoners.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
describing the scene after the battle of February 4-5, 1899, said:
In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth
Artillery there were 1,oo8 dead niggers, and a great many wounded. We
burned all their houses. I don't know how many men, women, and
children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any prisoners.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XLI / Burning
Testimony of First Lieutenant Grover Flint,
...He testified further that he had seen hamlets, small towns of fifty
or sixty houses, burned by the American soldiers.... I saw it.... I
think the idea was at that time that the burning of these villages
would drive the people to the woods or to the towns,-a policy of
concentration, I think.... The people who lived in these houses were
apparently engaged in peaceful pursuits...
...He testified further that he had seen hamlets, small towns of fifty
or sixty houses, burned by the American soldiers.... I saw it.... I
think the idea was at that time that the burning of these villages
would drive the people to the woods or to the towns,-a policy of
concentration, I think.... The people who lived in these houses were
apparently engaged in peaceful pursuits...
American fury in the Philippines. XL / San Roque
Another charge grew out of a letter written by Corporal Williams as to
the looting of a village called St. Roque before June i, I899.
Williams, being asked, said that he wrote the letter, and that the
statement was "substantially true." The captain of his company stated that
the village of St. Roque was looted by the Iowa Regiment and the other
troops stationed at Cavite, that the men helped themselves to what
they found and destroyed articles of property they could not use, that
the colonel and other field officers did not exert themselves to stop
it, and that, while he disapproved of what was done, he did not feel
called upon under the circumstances to do anything about it. The
colonel and lieutenant-colonel stated that the town was burned by the
insurgents, and that the colonel ordered an officer to take charge of
the district, put out the fires, and collect and store all articles of
value. The colonel says, A part of the property so collected was
afterwards removed to Cavite for use of officers and men in the
quarters, which were found absolutely bare of furniture when my
regiment took station there.
the looting of a village called St. Roque before June i, I899.
Williams, being asked, said that he wrote the letter, and that the
statement was "substantially true." The captain of his company stated that
the village of St. Roque was looted by the Iowa Regiment and the other
troops stationed at Cavite, that the men helped themselves to what
they found and destroyed articles of property they could not use, that
the colonel and other field officers did not exert themselves to stop
it, and that, while he disapproved of what was done, he did not feel
called upon under the circumstances to do anything about it. The
colonel and lieutenant-colonel stated that the town was burned by the
insurgents, and that the colonel ordered an officer to take charge of
the district, put out the fires, and collect and store all articles of
value. The colonel says, A part of the property so collected was
afterwards removed to Cavite for use of officers and men in the
quarters, which were found absolutely bare of furniture when my
regiment took station there.
American fury in the Philippines. XXXIX / Extermination
"It was represented to me that the Filipino will not work; that even
when willing he can not work adequately; that increase of wages
merely enables him to enjoy more idleness, and that the introduction
of Chinese labor would act as a stimulus and by competition compel
him to work. I even met Americans (I am ashamed to say) who, in their
impatience at the slow-going Filipino, struck him or abused him with
violent language, and boldly declared that the only thing to do is to
exterminate him like the American Indian, replace him by Chinese, and
develop the country...
My professed friendship for the Filipinos and my indignation at such
un-American conduct on the part of not a few of my fellowcountrymen
compelled me to study this problem..."
David H. Doherty, 1904
when willing he can not work adequately; that increase of wages
merely enables him to enjoy more idleness, and that the introduction
of Chinese labor would act as a stimulus and by competition compel
him to work. I even met Americans (I am ashamed to say) who, in their
impatience at the slow-going Filipino, struck him or abused him with
violent language, and boldly declared that the only thing to do is to
exterminate him like the American Indian, replace him by Chinese, and
develop the country...
My professed friendship for the Filipinos and my indignation at such
un-American conduct on the part of not a few of my fellowcountrymen
compelled me to study this problem..."
David H. Doherty, 1904
American fury in the Philippines. XXXVIII / Genocide
CONCLUSIONS
From this review of the record certain things clearly appear:
I. That the destruction of Filipino life during the war has been so
frightful that it cannot be explained as the result of ordinary
civilized warfare. General J. M. Bell's statement that one-sixth of
the natives of Luzon - that is, some six hundred thousand persons -
had been killed or died of dengue fever in the first two years of the
war is evidence enough on this point, especially when coupled with his
further statement:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great, but I think not
one man has been slain except where his death served the legitimate
purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other
countries would be thought harsh measures,
but which Secretary Root calls measures of " marked humanity and
magnanimity." *
2. That at the very outset of the war there was strong reason to
believe that our troops were ordered by some officers to give no
quarter, and that no investigation was had because it was reported by
Lieut.-Colonel Crowder that the evidence " would implicate many
others," General Otis saying that the charge was " not very grievous
under the circumstances."
3. That from that time on, as is shown by the reports of killed and
wounded and by direct testimony, the practice continued.
4. That the War Department has never made any earnest effort to
investigate charges of this offence or to stop the practice.
5. That from the beginning of the war the practice of burning native
towns and villages and laying waste the country has continued.
* This statement is confirmed by the official report made by the
Secretary of the Civil Government in Batangas, the scene of General
Bell's operations. He says that the population has been reduced
one-third; ie., from 3oo,ooo to 2oo,ooo by the war and its attending
conditions.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
From this review of the record certain things clearly appear:
I. That the destruction of Filipino life during the war has been so
frightful that it cannot be explained as the result of ordinary
civilized warfare. General J. M. Bell's statement that one-sixth of
the natives of Luzon - that is, some six hundred thousand persons -
had been killed or died of dengue fever in the first two years of the
war is evidence enough on this point, especially when coupled with his
further statement:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great, but I think not
one man has been slain except where his death served the legitimate
purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other
countries would be thought harsh measures,
but which Secretary Root calls measures of " marked humanity and
magnanimity." *
2. That at the very outset of the war there was strong reason to
believe that our troops were ordered by some officers to give no
quarter, and that no investigation was had because it was reported by
Lieut.-Colonel Crowder that the evidence " would implicate many
others," General Otis saying that the charge was " not very grievous
under the circumstances."
3. That from that time on, as is shown by the reports of killed and
wounded and by direct testimony, the practice continued.
4. That the War Department has never made any earnest effort to
investigate charges of this offence or to stop the practice.
5. That from the beginning of the war the practice of burning native
towns and villages and laying waste the country has continued.
* This statement is confirmed by the official report made by the
Secretary of the Civil Government in Batangas, the scene of General
Bell's operations. He says that the population has been reduced
one-third; ie., from 3oo,ooo to 2oo,ooo by the war and its attending
conditions.
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
American fury in the Philippines. XXVI / Finish off
We advanced four miles and we fought every inch of the way;... saw
twenty-five dead insurgents in one place and twenty-seven in another,
besides a whole lot of them scattered along that I did not count....
It was like hunting rabbits; an insurgent would jump out of a hole or
the brush and run; he would not get very far.... I suppose you are not
interested in the way we do the job. We do not take prisoners. At
least the Twentieth Kansas do not.
--Arthur Minkler, of the Kansas Regiment
twenty-five dead insurgents in one place and twenty-seven in another,
besides a whole lot of them scattered along that I did not count....
It was like hunting rabbits; an insurgent would jump out of a hole or
the brush and run; he would not get very far.... I suppose you are not
interested in the way we do the job. We do not take prisoners. At
least the Twentieth Kansas do not.
--Arthur Minkler, of the Kansas Regiment
American fury in the Philippines. XXXV / Mass murder
A private in the Utah Battery:
"The cable news has kept the home folks fully informed as to the
progress of this 'goo-goo' hunt, so it is unnecessary to recount any
details of battles. The cruelties of Spain toward these people have
been fully discussed, but if the thing were written up by a recent
arrival here, he would make a tale just as harrowing. But the old boys
will say that no cruelty is too severe for these brainless monkeys,
who can appreciate no sense of honor, kindness, or justice.... With an
enemy like this to fight, it is not surprising that the boys should
soon adopt 'no quarter' as a motto, and fill the blacks full of lead
before finding out whether or not they are friends or enemies."
"The cable news has kept the home folks fully informed as to the
progress of this 'goo-goo' hunt, so it is unnecessary to recount any
details of battles. The cruelties of Spain toward these people have
been fully discussed, but if the thing were written up by a recent
arrival here, he would make a tale just as harrowing. But the old boys
will say that no cruelty is too severe for these brainless monkeys,
who can appreciate no sense of honor, kindness, or justice.... With an
enemy like this to fight, it is not surprising that the boys should
soon adopt 'no quarter' as a motto, and fill the blacks full of lead
before finding out whether or not they are friends or enemies."
American fury in the Philippines. XXXIV / Puente Colgante
Private Fred B. Hinchman, Company A, United States Engineers, writes
from Manila, February 22d:
"At 1:30 o'clock the general gave me a memorandum with regard to
sending out a Tennessee battalion to the line. He tersely put it that
'they were looking for a fight.' At the Puente Colgante (suspension
bridge) I met one of our company, who told me that the Fourteenth and
Washingtons were driving all before them, and taking no prisoners.
This is now our rule of procedure for cause. After delivering my
message I had not walked a block when I heard shots down the street.
Hurrying forward, I found a group of our men taking pot-shots across
the river, into a bamboo thicket, at about 1,200 yards. I longed to
join them, but had my reply to take back, and that, of course, was the
first thing to attend to. I reached the office at 3 P.M., just in time
to see a platoon of the Washingtons, with about fifty prisoners, who
had been taken before they learned how not to take them."
from Manila, February 22d:
"At 1:30 o'clock the general gave me a memorandum with regard to
sending out a Tennessee battalion to the line. He tersely put it that
'they were looking for a fight.' At the Puente Colgante (suspension
bridge) I met one of our company, who told me that the Fourteenth and
Washingtons were driving all before them, and taking no prisoners.
This is now our rule of procedure for cause. After delivering my
message I had not walked a block when I heard shots down the street.
Hurrying forward, I found a group of our men taking pot-shots across
the river, into a bamboo thicket, at about 1,200 yards. I longed to
join them, but had my reply to take back, and that, of course, was the
first thing to attend to. I reached the office at 3 P.M., just in time
to see a platoon of the Washingtons, with about fifty prisoners, who
had been taken before they learned how not to take them."
American fury in the Philippines. XXXIII / Finish off
In a letter to Mr. Herbert Welsh, of Philadelphia, an official of the
War Department says:
The aggregate killed and wounded [Filipinos] reported by commanding
officers is 14,643 killed and 3,297 wounded.... As to the number of
Filipinos whose deaths were due to the incidents of war, sickness,
burning of habitations, etc., we have no information.
The comparative figures of killed and wounded - nearly five killed to
one wounded if we take only the official returns - are absolutely
convincing. When we examine them in detail and find the returns quoted
of many killed and often no wounded, only one conclusion is possible.
In the fiercest battles of the Civil War the proportion was as
follows: at Antietam, where we attacked: killed, 2,o00; wounded,
9,416; at Fredericksburg, where we charged again and again under a
withering fire of rifles and cannon: killed, I, 180; wounded, 9,028;
at Gettysburg, where two veteran armies joined in desperate battle:
killed, 2,834; wounded, 13,709; at Cold Harbor, where the carnage was
frightful: killed, 1,905; wounded, 10, 570.
In the recent Boer War the proportion is the same. At Magersfontein:
killed, I71; wounded, 691; at Colenso: killed, 50; wounded, 847. In
all battles from October, i899, to June, 1900: killed, 2,518; wounded,
11,405.
In no war where the usages of civilized warfare have been respected
has the number of killed approached the number of wounded more nearly
than these figures. The rule is generally about five wounded to one
killed. What shall we say of a war where the proportions are reversed?
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929
War Department says:
The aggregate killed and wounded [Filipinos] reported by commanding
officers is 14,643 killed and 3,297 wounded.... As to the number of
Filipinos whose deaths were due to the incidents of war, sickness,
burning of habitations, etc., we have no information.
The comparative figures of killed and wounded - nearly five killed to
one wounded if we take only the official returns - are absolutely
convincing. When we examine them in detail and find the returns quoted
of many killed and often no wounded, only one conclusion is possible.
In the fiercest battles of the Civil War the proportion was as
follows: at Antietam, where we attacked: killed, 2,o00; wounded,
9,416; at Fredericksburg, where we charged again and again under a
withering fire of rifles and cannon: killed, I, 180; wounded, 9,028;
at Gettysburg, where two veteran armies joined in desperate battle:
killed, 2,834; wounded, 13,709; at Cold Harbor, where the carnage was
frightful: killed, 1,905; wounded, 10, 570.
In the recent Boer War the proportion is the same. At Magersfontein:
killed, I71; wounded, 691; at Colenso: killed, 50; wounded, 847. In
all battles from October, i899, to June, 1900: killed, 2,518; wounded,
11,405.
In no war where the usages of civilized warfare have been respected
has the number of killed approached the number of wounded more nearly
than these figures. The rule is generally about five wounded to one
killed. What shall we say of a war where the proportions are reversed?
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929
American fury n the Philippines. XXXII / Loboo
BATANGAS, Dec. 26, I901.
I have become convinced that within two months at the outside there
will be no more insurrection in this brigade. We may not have secured
all the guns or caught all the insurgents by that time, and the
present insurrection will end and the men and the guns will be secured
in time.... I am practically sure they cannot remain here in Batangas,
Laguna, and a part of Tayabas. The people are now assembled in the
towns, with all the visible food supply except that cached by
insurgents in the mountains. For the next six days all station
commanders will be employed hunting insurgents and their hidden food
supplies within their respective jurisdictions. Population of each
town will be turned out, and all transportation that can be found
impressed to bring into government storehouses all food that is found,
if it be possible to transport it. If not, it will be destroyed.
I am now assembling in the neighborhood of twenty-five hundred men,
who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I expect to
accompany the command. Of course, no such strength is necessary to
cope with all the insurgents in the Philippine Islands, but the
country is indescribably rough and badly cut up.... To the ravines and
mountains I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly
searching each ravine, valley, and mountain-peak for insurgents and
for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of town,. All
able-bodied men will be killed or captured. Old men, women, and
children will be sent to towns. This movement begins January x, by
which time I hope to have nearly all the food supply in the towns. If
insurgents hide their guns and come into the towns, it will be to my
advantage; for I shall put such a pressure on town officials and
police that they will be compelled to identify insurgents.t If I catch
these, I shall get their guns in time. I expect to first clean out the
wide Loboo Peninsula south of Bantangas, Tiasan, and San Juan de Boc
Boc road. I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and
sweep the country westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning
through Lipa.
I shall scour and clean up the Lipa Mountains. Swinging northward, the
country in the vicinity of San Pablo, Alaminos, Tananan, and Santo
Tomas, will be scoured, ending at Mount Maguiling, which will then be
thoroughly searched and devastated. This is said to be the home of
Malvar and his parents.
Swinging back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the
country of which Mount Cristobal and Mount Banabao are the main peaks.
These two mountains, Mount Maguiling, and the mountains north-east of
Loboo are the main haunts of the insurgents. After the 1rst of January
no one will be permitted to move about without a pass....
These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense,
and they should have it for the good of all concerned. Sixto Lopez is
now interested in peace because I have in jail all the male members of
his family found in my jurisdiction, and have seized his houses and
palay and his steamer.
General Bell
I have become convinced that within two months at the outside there
will be no more insurrection in this brigade. We may not have secured
all the guns or caught all the insurgents by that time, and the
present insurrection will end and the men and the guns will be secured
in time.... I am practically sure they cannot remain here in Batangas,
Laguna, and a part of Tayabas. The people are now assembled in the
towns, with all the visible food supply except that cached by
insurgents in the mountains. For the next six days all station
commanders will be employed hunting insurgents and their hidden food
supplies within their respective jurisdictions. Population of each
town will be turned out, and all transportation that can be found
impressed to bring into government storehouses all food that is found,
if it be possible to transport it. If not, it will be destroyed.
I am now assembling in the neighborhood of twenty-five hundred men,
who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I expect to
accompany the command. Of course, no such strength is necessary to
cope with all the insurgents in the Philippine Islands, but the
country is indescribably rough and badly cut up.... To the ravines and
mountains I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly
searching each ravine, valley, and mountain-peak for insurgents and
for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of town,. All
able-bodied men will be killed or captured. Old men, women, and
children will be sent to towns. This movement begins January x, by
which time I hope to have nearly all the food supply in the towns. If
insurgents hide their guns and come into the towns, it will be to my
advantage; for I shall put such a pressure on town officials and
police that they will be compelled to identify insurgents.t If I catch
these, I shall get their guns in time. I expect to first clean out the
wide Loboo Peninsula south of Bantangas, Tiasan, and San Juan de Boc
Boc road. I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and
sweep the country westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning
through Lipa.
I shall scour and clean up the Lipa Mountains. Swinging northward, the
country in the vicinity of San Pablo, Alaminos, Tananan, and Santo
Tomas, will be scoured, ending at Mount Maguiling, which will then be
thoroughly searched and devastated. This is said to be the home of
Malvar and his parents.
Swinging back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the
country of which Mount Cristobal and Mount Banabao are the main peaks.
These two mountains, Mount Maguiling, and the mountains north-east of
Loboo are the main haunts of the insurgents. After the 1rst of January
no one will be permitted to move about without a pass....
These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense,
and they should have it for the good of all concerned. Sixto Lopez is
now interested in peace because I have in jail all the male members of
his family found in my jurisdiction, and have seized his houses and
palay and his steamer.
General Bell
American fury in the Philippines. XXXI / Luzón
The Boston Advertiser is a Republican newspaper, and in its columns
appeared this statement:
- The time has come, in the opinion of those in charge of the War
Department, to pursue a policy of absolute and relentless subjugation
in the Philippine Islands. If the natives refuse to submit to the
process of government as mapped out by the Taft Commission, they will
be hunted down and will be killed until there is no longer any show of
forcible resistance to the American government. The process will not
be pleasant, but it is considered necessary.
Who has been the person in charge of the War Department ever since
the Taft Commission was appointed, and has not this statement been
proved to be true by what has happened since? On May 3, I9oI, General
James M. Bell, in an interview printed in the New York Times, said:
One-sixth of the natives of Luzon have either been killed or died of
the dengue fever in the last two years;
and, as Senator Hoar said, I suppose that this dengue fever and the
sickness which depopulated Batangas is the direct result of the war,
and comes from the condition of starvation and bad food which the war
has caused. General Bell is a witness whom the War Department cannot
discredit. " One-sixth of the population of Luzon "- one in every six
of men, women, and children - had either been killed or died in two
years. This means 666,ooo people. The population of Luzon is estimated
by the War Department to be 3,727,488 persons.* How many were killed,
and how? General Bell gave a suggestive answer when he said as a part
of the same statement:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great, but I think not
one man has been slain except where his death served the legitimate
purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other
countries would probably be thought harsh measures.
A Republican Congressman, who visited the Philippines during the
summer of 1901, confirms this answer in an interview published in the
Boston Transcript, and in other newspapers, on March 4, 1902:
You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the secret
of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of the pacification
of the archipelago. They never rebel in Northern Luzon because there
isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned
out in a most resolute manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the
number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no
prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country, and,
wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino, they killed
him. The women and children were spared, and may now be noticed in
disproportionate numbers in -that part of the island. Thus did we here
protect " the patient... millions."
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
appeared this statement:
- The time has come, in the opinion of those in charge of the War
Department, to pursue a policy of absolute and relentless subjugation
in the Philippine Islands. If the natives refuse to submit to the
process of government as mapped out by the Taft Commission, they will
be hunted down and will be killed until there is no longer any show of
forcible resistance to the American government. The process will not
be pleasant, but it is considered necessary.
Who has been the person in charge of the War Department ever since
the Taft Commission was appointed, and has not this statement been
proved to be true by what has happened since? On May 3, I9oI, General
James M. Bell, in an interview printed in the New York Times, said:
One-sixth of the natives of Luzon have either been killed or died of
the dengue fever in the last two years;
and, as Senator Hoar said, I suppose that this dengue fever and the
sickness which depopulated Batangas is the direct result of the war,
and comes from the condition of starvation and bad food which the war
has caused. General Bell is a witness whom the War Department cannot
discredit. " One-sixth of the population of Luzon "- one in every six
of men, women, and children - had either been killed or died in two
years. This means 666,ooo people. The population of Luzon is estimated
by the War Department to be 3,727,488 persons.* How many were killed,
and how? General Bell gave a suggestive answer when he said as a part
of the same statement:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great, but I think not
one man has been slain except where his death served the legitimate
purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other
countries would probably be thought harsh measures.
A Republican Congressman, who visited the Philippines during the
summer of 1901, confirms this answer in an interview published in the
Boston Transcript, and in other newspapers, on March 4, 1902:
You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the secret
of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of the pacification
of the archipelago. They never rebel in Northern Luzon because there
isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned
out in a most resolute manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the
number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no
prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country, and,
wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino, they killed
him. The women and children were spared, and may now be noticed in
disproportionate numbers in -that part of the island. Thus did we here
protect " the patient... millions."
Title: Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine
warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and
utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.
Author: Storey, Moorfield, 1845-1929.
May 24, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. XXX / Panay
Letter of Mr. Nelson is in the Boston Herald of August 25, 1902
...There is probably no island in the archipelago where it was used
oftener and with better effect than in Panay.... When General Hughes
began his vigorous campaign, Panay was one of the worst of the
islands: to-day it is one of the best.... And there seems to be no
doubt that these conditions are due to the stern measures adopted to
crush out guerilla warfare and ladronism. There was talk of
promiscuous burning in connection with General Smith. Let me tell you
what it really means when you can see it. The Eighteenth Regulars
marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz in the north of Panay, under
orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result
was they left a strip of land sixty miles wide from one end of the
island to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have
flown without provisions. That is what burning means, and no more.
...There is probably no island in the archipelago where it was used
oftener and with better effect than in Panay.... When General Hughes
began his vigorous campaign, Panay was one of the worst of the
islands: to-day it is one of the best.... And there seems to be no
doubt that these conditions are due to the stern measures adopted to
crush out guerilla warfare and ladronism. There was talk of
promiscuous burning in connection with General Smith. Let me tell you
what it really means when you can see it. The Eighteenth Regulars
marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz in the north of Panay, under
orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result
was they left a strip of land sixty miles wide from one end of the
island to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have
flown without provisions. That is what burning means, and no more.
American fury in the Philippines. XXIX / Extermination
Letter of an officer who had served in the islands .
- There is no use mincing words. There are but two possible
conclusions to the matter. We must conquer and hold the islands or get
out. The question is, Which shall it be? If we decide to stay, we must
bury all qualms and scruples about Weylerian cruelty, the consent of
the governed, etc., and stay. We exterminated the American Indians,
and I guess most of us are proud of it, or, at least, believe the end
justified the means; and we must have no scruples about exterminating
this other race standing in the way of progress and enlightenment, if
it is necessary.
- There is no use mincing words. There are but two possible
conclusions to the matter. We must conquer and hold the islands or get
out. The question is, Which shall it be? If we decide to stay, we must
bury all qualms and scruples about Weylerian cruelty, the consent of
the governed, etc., and stay. We exterminated the American Indians,
and I guess most of us are proud of it, or, at least, believe the end
justified the means; and we must have no scruples about exterminating
this other race standing in the way of progress and enlightenment, if
it is necessary.
American fury in the Philippines. XXVIII
Senator RAWLINS. If these shacks were of no consequence what was the
utility of their destruction?
General HUGHES
S. The destruction was as a punishment. They permitted these people to
come in there and conceal themselves and they gave no sign. It is always _
Senator RAWLINS. The punishment in that case would fall, not upon the
men, who could go elsewhere, but mainly upon the women and little
children.
General HUGHES. The women and children are part of the family, and
where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably
worse in that way than in any other.
Senator RAWLINS. But is that within the ordinary rules of civilized
warfare? Of course you could exterminate the family, which would be
still worse punishment.
General HUGHES. These people are not civilized.
Senator RAWLINS. Then I understand you to say it is not civilized
warfare?
General HUGHES. No: I think it is not.
Senator RAWLINS. Is it not true that operations in the islands became
progressively more severe within the past year and a half in dealing
with districts which were disturbed?
General HUGHES. I think that is true. I would not say it is entirely
so. The severities depend upon the man immediately in command of the
force that he has with him. In the department I suppose I had at times
as many as a hundred and twenty commands in the field. Each commander,
under general restrictions, had authority to act for himself. These
commanders were changed from time to time. The new commanders coming
in would probably start in very much easier than the old ones.
Senator HALE. Very much what?
General HUGHES. Easier. They would come from this country with their
ideas of civilized warfare, and they were allowed to get their lesson.
utility of their destruction?
General HUGHES
S. The destruction was as a punishment. They permitted these people to
come in there and conceal themselves and they gave no sign. It is always _
Senator RAWLINS. The punishment in that case would fall, not upon the
men, who could go elsewhere, but mainly upon the women and little
children.
General HUGHES. The women and children are part of the family, and
where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably
worse in that way than in any other.
Senator RAWLINS. But is that within the ordinary rules of civilized
warfare? Of course you could exterminate the family, which would be
still worse punishment.
General HUGHES. These people are not civilized.
Senator RAWLINS. Then I understand you to say it is not civilized
warfare?
General HUGHES. No: I think it is not.
Senator RAWLINS. Is it not true that operations in the islands became
progressively more severe within the past year and a half in dealing
with districts which were disturbed?
General HUGHES. I think that is true. I would not say it is entirely
so. The severities depend upon the man immediately in command of the
force that he has with him. In the department I suppose I had at times
as many as a hundred and twenty commands in the field. Each commander,
under general restrictions, had authority to act for himself. These
commanders were changed from time to time. The new commanders coming
in would probably start in very much easier than the old ones.
Senator HALE. Very much what?
General HUGHES. Easier. They would come from this country with their
ideas of civilized warfare, and they were allowed to get their lesson.
American fury in the Philippines. XXVII / Marilao
The special correspondent of the Boston Transcript, as early as April
14, 1899, wrote from Marilao:
"Just watch our smoke " is what the Minnesota and Oregon regiments
have adopted for a motto since their experiences of the last few days.
Their trail was eight miles long; and the smoke of burning buildings
and rice heaps rose into the heaven the entire distance, and obscured
the face of the landscape for many hours. They started at daylight
this morning, driving the rebels before them and setting the torch to
everything burnable in their course. This was in retaliation for a
night attack."
14, 1899, wrote from Marilao:
"Just watch our smoke " is what the Minnesota and Oregon regiments
have adopted for a motto since their experiences of the last few days.
Their trail was eight miles long; and the smoke of burning buildings
and rice heaps rose into the heaven the entire distance, and obscured
the face of the landscape for many hours. They started at daylight
this morning, driving the rebels before them and setting the torch to
everything burnable in their course. This was in retaliation for a
night attack."
American fury in the Philippines. XXVI / Reconcentration
Here is testimony from another source as to an undoubted concentration
camp. It comes through Senator Bacon, of Georgia, from whose speech in
the Senate the following extract is taken:Mr. President, I want to
read to you a description of a reconcentrado camp. I will say that
this letter is written by an officer whom I know personally, and for
whom I vouch in my place in the Senate as a high-toned man and a
courageous and chivalric officer, one who does his duty regardless of
whether he approves of the cause in which he is told to fight or not,
and one in every way worthy of confidence and esteem. This was a
letter written by him with no injunction of secrecy in it, because he
had no idea or thought that it would ever be made public. I make it
public now simply for the information of the Senate, in order that
they may have some idea of what a reconcentrado camp is. I omit the
name of the place from which the letter was written for the same
reason that I omit the name of the officer. I will not say any more of
him than that he is a graduate of West Point and a professional
soldier. I will state further that there is some allusion in the
letter to vampires. A vampire in those islands is a bird about the
size of a crow, which wheels and circles above the head at night, and
which is plainly visible at night. As I have said, I know the officer
personally and vouch for him in every way. Senators will see from the
reading of this letter that it is simply the casual and ordinary
narration of a friend writing to a friend. He says: — " On our way
over here we stopped at - in peaceful - to leave our surplus stuff so
as to get into "I have left out these names - "light shape; and, as we
landed at midnight there, they weren't satisfied with bolos and
shotguns, but little brown brother actually fired upon us with brass
cannon in that officially quiet burg under efficient civil government.
What a farce it all is " That is his comment on that fact. "Well,
consider, ten miles and over down the coast, we found a great deposit
of mud just off the mouth of the river, and after waiting eight hours
managed to get over the bar without being stuck but three times - and
the tug drew three feet. " Then eight miles up a slimy, winding bayou
of a river until at 4 A.M. we struck a piece of spongy ground about
twenty feet above the sea-level. Now you have us located. It rains
continually in a way that would have made Noah marvel. And trails, if
you can find one, make the 'Slough of Despond' seem like an asphalt
pavement. Now this little spot of black sogginess is a reconcentrado
pen, with a dead-line outside, beyond which everything living is shot.
"This corpse-carcass stench wafted in and combined with some lovely
municipal odors besides makes it slightly unpleasant here. " Upon
arrival I found thirty cases of small-pox and average fresh ones of
five a day, which practically have to be turned out to die. At
nightfall clouds of huge vampire bats softly swirl out on their orgies
over the dead. "Mosquitoes work in relays, and keep up their pestering
day and night. There is a pleasing uncertainty as to your being boloed
before morning or being cut down in the long grass or sniped at. It
seems way out of the world without a sight of the sea,- in fact, more
like some suburb of hell."
camp. It comes through Senator Bacon, of Georgia, from whose speech in
the Senate the following extract is taken:Mr. President, I want to
read to you a description of a reconcentrado camp. I will say that
this letter is written by an officer whom I know personally, and for
whom I vouch in my place in the Senate as a high-toned man and a
courageous and chivalric officer, one who does his duty regardless of
whether he approves of the cause in which he is told to fight or not,
and one in every way worthy of confidence and esteem. This was a
letter written by him with no injunction of secrecy in it, because he
had no idea or thought that it would ever be made public. I make it
public now simply for the information of the Senate, in order that
they may have some idea of what a reconcentrado camp is. I omit the
name of the place from which the letter was written for the same
reason that I omit the name of the officer. I will not say any more of
him than that he is a graduate of West Point and a professional
soldier. I will state further that there is some allusion in the
letter to vampires. A vampire in those islands is a bird about the
size of a crow, which wheels and circles above the head at night, and
which is plainly visible at night. As I have said, I know the officer
personally and vouch for him in every way. Senators will see from the
reading of this letter that it is simply the casual and ordinary
narration of a friend writing to a friend. He says: — " On our way
over here we stopped at - in peaceful - to leave our surplus stuff so
as to get into "I have left out these names - "light shape; and, as we
landed at midnight there, they weren't satisfied with bolos and
shotguns, but little brown brother actually fired upon us with brass
cannon in that officially quiet burg under efficient civil government.
What a farce it all is " That is his comment on that fact. "Well,
consider, ten miles and over down the coast, we found a great deposit
of mud just off the mouth of the river, and after waiting eight hours
managed to get over the bar without being stuck but three times - and
the tug drew three feet. " Then eight miles up a slimy, winding bayou
of a river until at 4 A.M. we struck a piece of spongy ground about
twenty feet above the sea-level. Now you have us located. It rains
continually in a way that would have made Noah marvel. And trails, if
you can find one, make the 'Slough of Despond' seem like an asphalt
pavement. Now this little spot of black sogginess is a reconcentrado
pen, with a dead-line outside, beyond which everything living is shot.
"This corpse-carcass stench wafted in and combined with some lovely
municipal odors besides makes it slightly unpleasant here. " Upon
arrival I found thirty cases of small-pox and average fresh ones of
five a day, which practically have to be turned out to die. At
nightfall clouds of huge vampire bats softly swirl out on their orgies
over the dead. "Mosquitoes work in relays, and keep up their pestering
day and night. There is a pleasing uncertainty as to your being boloed
before morning or being cut down in the long grass or sniped at. It
seems way out of the world without a sight of the sea,- in fact, more
like some suburb of hell."
American fury in the Philippines. XXV / Torture
Manila Times of March 5, 1902.
" In several instances natives who were captured were tied to trees
and submitted to a series of slow tortures that finally resulted in
death, in some instances the victims living for three or four days.
The treatment was the most cruel and brutal imaginable. Natives were
tied to trees, and, in order to make them give confession, they were
shot through the legs and left thus to suffer trough the night, only
to be given a repetition of the treatment the next day, in some
instances the treatment lasting as long as four days before the
miserable creatures were relieved by death."
" In several instances natives who were captured were tied to trees
and submitted to a series of slow tortures that finally resulted in
death, in some instances the victims living for three or four days.
The treatment was the most cruel and brutal imaginable. Natives were
tied to trees, and, in order to make them give confession, they were
shot through the legs and left thus to suffer trough the night, only
to be given a repetition of the treatment the next day, in some
instances the treatment lasting as long as four days before the
miserable creatures were relieved by death."
American fury in the Philippines. XXIV / Samar
[Circular No. 6.]
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE, TACLOBAN, LEYTE-, P.I., Dec. 24,
1901.
To All Station Commanders:
The brigade commander has become thoroughly convinced from the great
mass of evidence at hand that the insurrection for some time past and
still in force in the island of Samar has been supported solely by the
people who live in the pueblos ostensibly pursuing their peaceful
pursuits and enjoying American protection, and that this is especially
true in regard to the "pudientes," or wealthy class. He is and for
some time past has been satisfied that the people themselves, and
especially this wealthy and influential class, can stop this
insurrection at any time they make up their minds to do so; that up to
the present time they do not want peace; that they are working in
every way and to the utmost of their ability to prevent peace. He is
satisfied that this class, while openly talking peace, is doing so
simply to gain the confidence of our officers and soldiers, only to
betray them to the insurrectos, or, in short, that while ostensibly
aiding the Americans, they are in reality secretly doing everything in
their power to support and maintain this insurrection. Under such
conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is to adopt
the policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning
desire for the war to cease,- a desire or longing so intense, so
personal especially to every individual of the class mentioned, and so
real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to
bringing about a state of real peace, that will impel them to join
hands with the Americans in the accomplishment of this end. The policy
to be pursued in this brigade, from this time on, will be to wage war
in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible. This policy will
apply to the island of Samar and such other portions of the brigade to
which it may become necessary to apply it, even though such territory
is supposedly peaceful or is under civil government. In waging this
warfare, officers of this brigade are directed and expected to
co-operate to their utmost, so as to terminate this war as soon as
practicable, since short severe wars are the most humane in the end.
No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a
humanitarian basis. In waging this war, officers will be guided by the
provisions of General Orders, No. o00, Adjutant-general's Office,
1863, which order promulgates the instructions for the government of
the armies of the United States in the field. (Copies of this order
will be furnished to the troops of this brigade as soon as
practicable. In the mean time commanding officers will personally see
to it that the younger and less experienced officers of the command
are instructed in the provisions of this order, wherever it is
possible to do so.)
Commanding officers are earnestly requested and expected to exercise,
without reference to these headquarters, their own discretion in the
adoption of any and all measures of warfare coming within the
provisions of this general order which will tend to accomplish the
desired results in the most direct way or in the shortest possible
space of time.They will also encourage the younger officers of their
commands to constantly look for, engage, harass, and annoy the enemy
in the field; and to this end commanding officers will repose a large
amount of confidence in these subordinate officers, and will permit to
them a large latitude of action and a discretion similar to that
herein conferred upon the commanding officers of stations by these
headquarters. In dealing with the natives of all classes, officers
will be guided by the following principles:
First. Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or
barrios, will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has
conclusively shown that he is a friend. This he cannot do by mere
words or promises, nor by imparting information which, while true, is
old or stale and of no value; nor can it be done by aiding us in ways
that do no material harm to the insurgents. In short, the only manner
in which the native can demonstrate his loyalty is by some positive
act or acts that actually and positively commit him to us, thereby
severing his relations with the insurrectos and producing or tending
to produce distinctively unfriendly relations with the insurgents. Not
only the ordinary natives, but especially those of influence and
position in the pueblos, who manifestly and openly cultivate friendly
relations with the Americans, will be regarded with particular
suspicion, since by the announced policy of the insurgent government
their ablest and most stanch friends or those who are capable of most
skilfully practising duplicity are selected and directed to cultivate
the friendship of American officers, so as to obtain their confidence,
and to secretly communicate to the insurgents everything that the
Americans do or contemplate doing, particularly with regard to the
movement of troops. In a word, friendship for the Americans on the
part of any native will be measured directly and solely by his acts;
and neither sentiment nor social reasons of any kind will be permitted
to enter into the determination of such friendship.
Second. It will be regarded as a certainty that all officials of the
pueblos and barrios are likewise officials of Lukban and his officers,
or at least that they are in actual touch and sympathy with the
insurgent leaders, and that they are in secret aiding these leaders
with information, supplies, etc., wherever possible. Officers will not
be misled by the fact that officials of the pueblos pass ordinances
inimical to those in insurrection, or by any action taken by them,
either collectively or individually. The public acts of pueblo
councils that are favorable to the Americans are usually negative by
secret communication on the part of the parties enacting them to those
in insurrection. Therefore, such acts cannot be taken as a guide in
determining the friendship or lack of it of these officials for the
American government.
Third. The taking of the oath of allegiance by officials, presidentes,
vice-presidentes, consejeros, principales, tenientes of barrios, or
other people of influence, does not indicate that they or any of them
have espoused the American cause, since it is a well-established fact
that these people frequently take the oath of allegiance with the
direct object and intent of enabling them to be of greater service to
their real friends in the field. In short, the loyalty of these people
is to be determined only by acts which, when combined with their usual
course of conduct, irrevocably binds them to the American cause.
Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time
has now arrived when all natives in this brigade, who are not openly
for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active
friend, he is an open enemy.
Fourth. The most dangerous class with whom we have to deal is the
wealthy sympathizer and contributor. This class comprises not only all
those officials and principales above mentioned, but all those of
importance who live in the pueblos with their families. By far the
most important as well as the most dangerous member of this class is
the native priest. He is most dangerous; and he is successful because
he is usually the best informed, besides wielding an immense influence
with the people by virtue of his position. He has much to lose, in his
opinion, and but little to gain through American supremacy in these
island. It is expected that officers will exercise their best
endeavors to suppress and prevent aid being given by the people of
this class, especially by the native priests. Wherever there is
evidence of this assistance, or where there is a strong suspicion that
they are thus secretly aiding the enemies of our government, they will
be confined and held. The profession of the priest will not prevent
his arrest or proceedings against him. If the evidence is sufficient,
they,will be tried by the proper court. If there is not sufficient
evidence to convict, they will be arrested and confined as a military
necessity, and held as prisoners of war until released by orders from
these headquarters. It will be borne in mind that in these islands, as
a rule, it is next to impossible to secure evidence against men of
influence, and especially against the native priests, so long as they
are at large. On the other hand, after they are arrested and confined,
it is usually quite easy to secure abundant evidence against them.
Officers in command of stations will not hesitate, therefore, to
arrest and detain individuals whom they have good reasons to suspect
are aiding the insurrection, even when positive evidence is lacking....
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE, TACLOBAN, LEYTE-, P.I., Dec. 24,
1901.
To All Station Commanders:
The brigade commander has become thoroughly convinced from the great
mass of evidence at hand that the insurrection for some time past and
still in force in the island of Samar has been supported solely by the
people who live in the pueblos ostensibly pursuing their peaceful
pursuits and enjoying American protection, and that this is especially
true in regard to the "pudientes," or wealthy class. He is and for
some time past has been satisfied that the people themselves, and
especially this wealthy and influential class, can stop this
insurrection at any time they make up their minds to do so; that up to
the present time they do not want peace; that they are working in
every way and to the utmost of their ability to prevent peace. He is
satisfied that this class, while openly talking peace, is doing so
simply to gain the confidence of our officers and soldiers, only to
betray them to the insurrectos, or, in short, that while ostensibly
aiding the Americans, they are in reality secretly doing everything in
their power to support and maintain this insurrection. Under such
conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is to adopt
the policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning
desire for the war to cease,- a desire or longing so intense, so
personal especially to every individual of the class mentioned, and so
real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to
bringing about a state of real peace, that will impel them to join
hands with the Americans in the accomplishment of this end. The policy
to be pursued in this brigade, from this time on, will be to wage war
in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible. This policy will
apply to the island of Samar and such other portions of the brigade to
which it may become necessary to apply it, even though such territory
is supposedly peaceful or is under civil government. In waging this
warfare, officers of this brigade are directed and expected to
co-operate to their utmost, so as to terminate this war as soon as
practicable, since short severe wars are the most humane in the end.
No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a
humanitarian basis. In waging this war, officers will be guided by the
provisions of General Orders, No. o00, Adjutant-general's Office,
1863, which order promulgates the instructions for the government of
the armies of the United States in the field. (Copies of this order
will be furnished to the troops of this brigade as soon as
practicable. In the mean time commanding officers will personally see
to it that the younger and less experienced officers of the command
are instructed in the provisions of this order, wherever it is
possible to do so.)
Commanding officers are earnestly requested and expected to exercise,
without reference to these headquarters, their own discretion in the
adoption of any and all measures of warfare coming within the
provisions of this general order which will tend to accomplish the
desired results in the most direct way or in the shortest possible
space of time.They will also encourage the younger officers of their
commands to constantly look for, engage, harass, and annoy the enemy
in the field; and to this end commanding officers will repose a large
amount of confidence in these subordinate officers, and will permit to
them a large latitude of action and a discretion similar to that
herein conferred upon the commanding officers of stations by these
headquarters. In dealing with the natives of all classes, officers
will be guided by the following principles:
First. Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or
barrios, will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has
conclusively shown that he is a friend. This he cannot do by mere
words or promises, nor by imparting information which, while true, is
old or stale and of no value; nor can it be done by aiding us in ways
that do no material harm to the insurgents. In short, the only manner
in which the native can demonstrate his loyalty is by some positive
act or acts that actually and positively commit him to us, thereby
severing his relations with the insurrectos and producing or tending
to produce distinctively unfriendly relations with the insurgents. Not
only the ordinary natives, but especially those of influence and
position in the pueblos, who manifestly and openly cultivate friendly
relations with the Americans, will be regarded with particular
suspicion, since by the announced policy of the insurgent government
their ablest and most stanch friends or those who are capable of most
skilfully practising duplicity are selected and directed to cultivate
the friendship of American officers, so as to obtain their confidence,
and to secretly communicate to the insurgents everything that the
Americans do or contemplate doing, particularly with regard to the
movement of troops. In a word, friendship for the Americans on the
part of any native will be measured directly and solely by his acts;
and neither sentiment nor social reasons of any kind will be permitted
to enter into the determination of such friendship.
Second. It will be regarded as a certainty that all officials of the
pueblos and barrios are likewise officials of Lukban and his officers,
or at least that they are in actual touch and sympathy with the
insurgent leaders, and that they are in secret aiding these leaders
with information, supplies, etc., wherever possible. Officers will not
be misled by the fact that officials of the pueblos pass ordinances
inimical to those in insurrection, or by any action taken by them,
either collectively or individually. The public acts of pueblo
councils that are favorable to the Americans are usually negative by
secret communication on the part of the parties enacting them to those
in insurrection. Therefore, such acts cannot be taken as a guide in
determining the friendship or lack of it of these officials for the
American government.
Third. The taking of the oath of allegiance by officials, presidentes,
vice-presidentes, consejeros, principales, tenientes of barrios, or
other people of influence, does not indicate that they or any of them
have espoused the American cause, since it is a well-established fact
that these people frequently take the oath of allegiance with the
direct object and intent of enabling them to be of greater service to
their real friends in the field. In short, the loyalty of these people
is to be determined only by acts which, when combined with their usual
course of conduct, irrevocably binds them to the American cause.
Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time
has now arrived when all natives in this brigade, who are not openly
for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active
friend, he is an open enemy.
Fourth. The most dangerous class with whom we have to deal is the
wealthy sympathizer and contributor. This class comprises not only all
those officials and principales above mentioned, but all those of
importance who live in the pueblos with their families. By far the
most important as well as the most dangerous member of this class is
the native priest. He is most dangerous; and he is successful because
he is usually the best informed, besides wielding an immense influence
with the people by virtue of his position. He has much to lose, in his
opinion, and but little to gain through American supremacy in these
island. It is expected that officers will exercise their best
endeavors to suppress and prevent aid being given by the people of
this class, especially by the native priests. Wherever there is
evidence of this assistance, or where there is a strong suspicion that
they are thus secretly aiding the enemies of our government, they will
be confined and held. The profession of the priest will not prevent
his arrest or proceedings against him. If the evidence is sufficient,
they,will be tried by the proper court. If there is not sufficient
evidence to convict, they will be arrested and confined as a military
necessity, and held as prisoners of war until released by orders from
these headquarters. It will be borne in mind that in these islands, as
a rule, it is next to impossible to secure evidence against men of
influence, and especially against the native priests, so long as they
are at large. On the other hand, after they are arrested and confined,
it is usually quite easy to secure abundant evidence against them.
Officers in command of stations will not hesitate, therefore, to
arrest and detain individuals whom they have good reasons to suspect
are aiding the insurrection, even when positive evidence is lacking....
American fury in the Philippines. XXIII / Marilao
MISSIONARY ASPECT.
The attention of the clergy and of others who advocate the enforcement
of Christianity at the point of the bayonet is called to the following
extract from a letter of a correspondent of the " Evening Post":
The country between Marilao and Manila presents a picture of
desolation. Smoke is curling from hundreds of ash heaps, and the
remains of trees and fences torn by shrapnel are to be seen
everywhere. The general appearance of the country is as if it had been
swept by a cyclone. The roads are strewn with furniture and clothing
dropped in flight by the Filipinos. The only persons remaining behind
are a few aged persons, too infirm to escape. They camp beside the
ruins of their former homes and beg passers-by for any kind of
assistance. The majority of them are living on the generosity of our
soldiers, who give them portions of their rations. The dogs of the
Filipinos cower in the bushes, still terrified and barking, while
hundreds of pigs are to be seen busily searching for food. Bodies of
dead Filipinos are stranded in the shallows of the river, or are lying
in the jungle where they crawled to die, or were left in the wake of
the hurriedly retreating army. These bodies give forth a horrible
stench, but there is no time now to bury them. The inhabitants who
fled from Marilao and Meycauayan left in such a panic that on the
tables our soldiers found money and valuables, and in the rooms were
trunks containing property of value. This was the case in most of the
houses deserted. They were not molested by our soldiers, but the
Chinese, who slip in between the armies, are looting when they can,
and have taken possession of several houses, over which they raised
Chinese flags, some of which were afterwards torn down. An old woman
was found hidden in a house at Meycauayan yesterday, just dead,
apparently from fright and hunger. The old woman named in the last
paragraph may be cited as one converted in this missionary enterprise.
Title: The Anti-imperialist.
Publication Info: Brookline, Mass.,: E. Atkinson.,
The attention of the clergy and of others who advocate the enforcement
of Christianity at the point of the bayonet is called to the following
extract from a letter of a correspondent of the " Evening Post":
The country between Marilao and Manila presents a picture of
desolation. Smoke is curling from hundreds of ash heaps, and the
remains of trees and fences torn by shrapnel are to be seen
everywhere. The general appearance of the country is as if it had been
swept by a cyclone. The roads are strewn with furniture and clothing
dropped in flight by the Filipinos. The only persons remaining behind
are a few aged persons, too infirm to escape. They camp beside the
ruins of their former homes and beg passers-by for any kind of
assistance. The majority of them are living on the generosity of our
soldiers, who give them portions of their rations. The dogs of the
Filipinos cower in the bushes, still terrified and barking, while
hundreds of pigs are to be seen busily searching for food. Bodies of
dead Filipinos are stranded in the shallows of the river, or are lying
in the jungle where they crawled to die, or were left in the wake of
the hurriedly retreating army. These bodies give forth a horrible
stench, but there is no time now to bury them. The inhabitants who
fled from Marilao and Meycauayan left in such a panic that on the
tables our soldiers found money and valuables, and in the rooms were
trunks containing property of value. This was the case in most of the
houses deserted. They were not molested by our soldiers, but the
Chinese, who slip in between the armies, are looting when they can,
and have taken possession of several houses, over which they raised
Chinese flags, some of which were afterwards torn down. An old woman
was found hidden in a house at Meycauayan yesterday, just dead,
apparently from fright and hunger. The old woman named in the last
paragraph may be cited as one converted in this missionary enterprise.
Title: The Anti-imperialist.
Publication Info: Brookline, Mass.,: E. Atkinson.,
May 22, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. XXII / Albay
The third count, the extreme methods of suppressing resistance
legalised by the Commission, as already mentioned, is best
illustrated in the policy of "reconcentration" earlier practised by
the military authorities.
The use of this plan for reducing a population to submission is
authorised by sec. 6 of the Commission's Act No. 781, further
organising the constabulary, in the following words:
In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids,
and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws
their source of food supply,... it shall be within the power of the
civil governor, upon resolution of the Commission, to authorise the
provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying
barrios be temporarily brought within stated proximity to the
poblaci6n or larger barrios....
It is a fact that no recent year has passed without the application
of this policy on a large scale. In 1902, it was undertaken in the
region about Lake Taal, comprising parts of Laguna and Bat@ngas
provinces. It then affected not less than 1oo,ooo people, according
to the report of Colonel Wagner, who inspected the camps, each of
which included from 8,000 to 14,000 persons. During 1903, the same
plan was pursued in Albay, where very large areas were entirely
deprived of population, the inhabitants being herded in camps like
those of Bat@ngas. During the current year, reconcentration has been
ordered for Samar (executive order of August I5th) throughout a
region including about 20,000 inhabitants. Besides the official
applications of the policy on a large scale, other instances have
occurred. Several camps now exist in Cavite, and not long since
reconcentration was tried in Tayabas without official authority,
according to Mr. Taft. The number of persons thus recently affected
by this policy under the civil government may be summed up as follows:
Bat@ngas, 1902..........................100,000
Albay, 1903............................ 300,000
Tayabas, 1903..........................15,000
Cavite, 1904............................16,000
Samar, 1904............................ 20,000
Total.......................... 451,000
Of these cases of reconcentration, the first four occurred on the
island of Luzon, the last on that of Samar. The combined population
of these islands being 3,921,000, it thus appears that about one
person in nine throughout the whole population suffered confinement
in the camps at some time during the years 1902-1904.
An effort has sometimes been made to show that the policy of
reconcentration involves no inhumanity, but it is beyond question,
from the testimony both of natives and Americans who are conversant
with the workings of reconcentration, that its effects are most
disastrous, causing widespread suffering. We may fully accept the
belief that reconcentration results in terrible hardship. In the
camps, food is distributed only when extreme want requires it, work
on the roads being sparingly furnished to those who are able thus to
supply themselves with rations. The lack of house accommodation and
the scarcity of food, as well as the overcrowding of the inmates of
the camps, have invariably caused marked increase in mortality. At
the same time, there has been a tremendous loss of crops and houses
throughout the districts in which reconcentration has taken place.
Henry Parker Willis, 1905
legalised by the Commission, as already mentioned, is best
illustrated in the policy of "reconcentration" earlier practised by
the military authorities.
The use of this plan for reducing a population to submission is
authorised by sec. 6 of the Commission's Act No. 781, further
organising the constabulary, in the following words:
In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids,
and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws
their source of food supply,... it shall be within the power of the
civil governor, upon resolution of the Commission, to authorise the
provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying
barrios be temporarily brought within stated proximity to the
poblaci6n or larger barrios....
It is a fact that no recent year has passed without the application
of this policy on a large scale. In 1902, it was undertaken in the
region about Lake Taal, comprising parts of Laguna and Bat@ngas
provinces. It then affected not less than 1oo,ooo people, according
to the report of Colonel Wagner, who inspected the camps, each of
which included from 8,000 to 14,000 persons. During 1903, the same
plan was pursued in Albay, where very large areas were entirely
deprived of population, the inhabitants being herded in camps like
those of Bat@ngas. During the current year, reconcentration has been
ordered for Samar (executive order of August I5th) throughout a
region including about 20,000 inhabitants. Besides the official
applications of the policy on a large scale, other instances have
occurred. Several camps now exist in Cavite, and not long since
reconcentration was tried in Tayabas without official authority,
according to Mr. Taft. The number of persons thus recently affected
by this policy under the civil government may be summed up as follows:
Bat@ngas, 1902..........................100,000
Albay, 1903............................ 300,000
Tayabas, 1903..........................15,000
Cavite, 1904............................16,000
Samar, 1904............................ 20,000
Total.......................... 451,000
Of these cases of reconcentration, the first four occurred on the
island of Luzon, the last on that of Samar. The combined population
of these islands being 3,921,000, it thus appears that about one
person in nine throughout the whole population suffered confinement
in the camps at some time during the years 1902-1904.
An effort has sometimes been made to show that the policy of
reconcentration involves no inhumanity, but it is beyond question,
from the testimony both of natives and Americans who are conversant
with the workings of reconcentration, that its effects are most
disastrous, causing widespread suffering. We may fully accept the
belief that reconcentration results in terrible hardship. In the
camps, food is distributed only when extreme want requires it, work
on the roads being sparingly furnished to those who are able thus to
supply themselves with rations. The lack of house accommodation and
the scarcity of food, as well as the overcrowding of the inmates of
the camps, have invariably caused marked increase in mortality. At
the same time, there has been a tremendous loss of crops and houses
throughout the districts in which reconcentration has taken place.
Henry Parker Willis, 1905
American fury in the Philippines. XXI / Batangas
"On returning to Manila my attention was called by a communication
from the Division Commander(copy enclosed herewith)to a transaction,
so far as I have ever known in all my experience or reading, is
without precedent and in direct violation of law. It appears that in
the district in which General Bell, commanding the 3rd Brigade,
operated, some 400,000people were concentrated in towns under what is
known as the order of reconcentration.They were given but fifteen days
to gather in what little property they had and come into these towns.
As thre order states, after that their property was subject to
destruction or confiscation. They were hold in those places for
several months, until they had nearly exhausted what little substance
they had. If it had been continued two weeks longer they either would
have had to be fed or they would have starved. During this time
General Bell and Colonel Woodruff, of the Comissary Department,
entered into an arrangement by which money, in the hands of the
Comissary Department, which had been appropiated by Congress to
support the Army, was used in buying great quantities of second
quality rice, which was shipped together with large quantities of
sugar, salt, and damaged flour, at government expense, and hauled to
different places for distribution by Government teams, or by private
teams forced into service without compensation, there to be sold not
at cost, but at a profit of 25 per cent, according to the
communication of General Davis. One excuse for entering into this
transaction and not permitting the ordinary traders to supply rice to
the community was the fear that it would go into the hands of the
insurgents, but the the distribution of supplies in this way continued
after Malvar surrendered, and when it was publicly stated that there
were no insurgents in the field. Not only was this second quality of
rice purchased and sold to a starving community in this way, but
according to the statement of Colonel Woodruff 128,000 pounds of
damaged flour was also sent to be sold at the invoce price of good
flour, together with the added profits that might be charged. In
addition to the costs and the profit, the persons distributing this
rice were authorised to compensate themselves. It does not appear what
the compensation was, whether large or small.
In the communication of General Davis it will be noticed that he
states that these people were considered prisoners of war, but we
might challenge history to produce an instance where prisoners of war,
reduced, as the official documents indicate, to a starving condition,
have been compelled to buy food at a large profit from those who held
them as prisoners..."
A special report from General Miles
Headquarters of the Army
Washington, Feb. 19, 1903
from the Division Commander(copy enclosed herewith)to a transaction,
so far as I have ever known in all my experience or reading, is
without precedent and in direct violation of law. It appears that in
the district in which General Bell, commanding the 3rd Brigade,
operated, some 400,000people were concentrated in towns under what is
known as the order of reconcentration.They were given but fifteen days
to gather in what little property they had and come into these towns.
As thre order states, after that their property was subject to
destruction or confiscation. They were hold in those places for
several months, until they had nearly exhausted what little substance
they had. If it had been continued two weeks longer they either would
have had to be fed or they would have starved. During this time
General Bell and Colonel Woodruff, of the Comissary Department,
entered into an arrangement by which money, in the hands of the
Comissary Department, which had been appropiated by Congress to
support the Army, was used in buying great quantities of second
quality rice, which was shipped together with large quantities of
sugar, salt, and damaged flour, at government expense, and hauled to
different places for distribution by Government teams, or by private
teams forced into service without compensation, there to be sold not
at cost, but at a profit of 25 per cent, according to the
communication of General Davis. One excuse for entering into this
transaction and not permitting the ordinary traders to supply rice to
the community was the fear that it would go into the hands of the
insurgents, but the the distribution of supplies in this way continued
after Malvar surrendered, and when it was publicly stated that there
were no insurgents in the field. Not only was this second quality of
rice purchased and sold to a starving community in this way, but
according to the statement of Colonel Woodruff 128,000 pounds of
damaged flour was also sent to be sold at the invoce price of good
flour, together with the added profits that might be charged. In
addition to the costs and the profit, the persons distributing this
rice were authorised to compensate themselves. It does not appear what
the compensation was, whether large or small.
In the communication of General Davis it will be noticed that he
states that these people were considered prisoners of war, but we
might challenge history to produce an instance where prisoners of war,
reduced, as the official documents indicate, to a starving condition,
have been compelled to buy food at a large profit from those who held
them as prisoners..."
A special report from General Miles
Headquarters of the Army
Washington, Feb. 19, 1903
American fury in the Philippines. XX / Batangas
Headquarters of the Army
Washington, Feb.19,1903
The Honorable, The Secretary of War:
Sir.—i have the honor to submit the following special report: in going
from calamba to bat@ngas on the 9th of november last, i noticed that
the country appeared to have been devastated, large sections lying
waste, and in the thirty-eight miles ride, i did not notice any of the
large fields under cultivation. small patches of ground were being
cultivated, but i should not think enough to supply food for the
people that i saw along the road. it was an open country, and easy of
observation. the people appeared to be more depressed than in any
other section of the archipelago. there were but very few men along
the road.
stopping at lipa, one of the principal towns, to change horses, while
at lunch with the commanding officer one of the officers reported that
some citizens desired to speak to me, which request was granted. the
party consisted of goribio catigbac, the acting presidente of the
town; gregorio aguilera, ex presidente; mr. jose luz, treasurer;doctor
sixto rojas and mr. rafael dimaywga. the conversation was in spanish,
and colonel maus, aide-de camp, and the last named man acted as
interpreter. these men were intelligent, well educated , very much in
earnest and apparently sincere. they stated that they desired to make
complaint of the harsh treatment of the people of that community; that
they had been concentrated in towns through that section of the
country, and had suffered great indignities; that fifteen of their
people had been tortured by what is known the water torture, and that
one man, a highly respected citizen, aged sixty-five, named vicente
luna, while suffering from effects of the torture and unconscious, was
dragged into his house, which had been set on fire, and burned to
death. they stated that these atrocities were commited by a company of
scouts under command of lieutenant hennesy, and that their people had
been crowded into towns, 600 being confined in one building. doctor
rojas stated that he was a practical physician, and that he was ready
to testify before any tribunal that some of those confined died of
suffocation. they asked me to look at the building, which i did. it
was one storey in height, 18 or 20 feet wide and possibly 60 or 70
feet long…"
lieutenant-general nelson a. miles
Washington, Feb.19,1903
The Honorable, The Secretary of War:
Sir.—i have the honor to submit the following special report: in going
from calamba to bat@ngas on the 9th of november last, i noticed that
the country appeared to have been devastated, large sections lying
waste, and in the thirty-eight miles ride, i did not notice any of the
large fields under cultivation. small patches of ground were being
cultivated, but i should not think enough to supply food for the
people that i saw along the road. it was an open country, and easy of
observation. the people appeared to be more depressed than in any
other section of the archipelago. there were but very few men along
the road.
stopping at lipa, one of the principal towns, to change horses, while
at lunch with the commanding officer one of the officers reported that
some citizens desired to speak to me, which request was granted. the
party consisted of goribio catigbac, the acting presidente of the
town; gregorio aguilera, ex presidente; mr. jose luz, treasurer;doctor
sixto rojas and mr. rafael dimaywga. the conversation was in spanish,
and colonel maus, aide-de camp, and the last named man acted as
interpreter. these men were intelligent, well educated , very much in
earnest and apparently sincere. they stated that they desired to make
complaint of the harsh treatment of the people of that community; that
they had been concentrated in towns through that section of the
country, and had suffered great indignities; that fifteen of their
people had been tortured by what is known the water torture, and that
one man, a highly respected citizen, aged sixty-five, named vicente
luna, while suffering from effects of the torture and unconscious, was
dragged into his house, which had been set on fire, and burned to
death. they stated that these atrocities were commited by a company of
scouts under command of lieutenant hennesy, and that their people had
been crowded into towns, 600 being confined in one building. doctor
rojas stated that he was a practical physician, and that he was ready
to testify before any tribunal that some of those confined died of
suffocation. they asked me to look at the building, which i did. it
was one storey in height, 18 or 20 feet wide and possibly 60 or 70
feet long…"
lieutenant-general nelson a. miles
American fury in the Philippines. XIX / Panay
Letter of Mr. Nelson is in the Boston Herald of August 25, 1902
...There is probably no island in the archipelago where it was used
oftener and with better effect than in Panay.... When General Hughes
began his vigorous campaign, Panay was one of the worst of the
islands: to-day it is one of the best.... And there seems to be no
doubt that these conditions are due to the stern measures adopted to
crush out guerilla warfare and ladronism. There was talk of
promiscuous burning in connection with General Smith. Let me tell you
what it really means when you can see it. The Eighteenth Regulars
marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz in the north of Panay, under
orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result
was they left a strip of land sixty miles wide from one end of the
island to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have
flown without provisions. That is what burning means, and no more.
...There is probably no island in the archipelago where it was used
oftener and with better effect than in Panay.... When General Hughes
began his vigorous campaign, Panay was one of the worst of the
islands: to-day it is one of the best.... And there seems to be no
doubt that these conditions are due to the stern measures adopted to
crush out guerilla warfare and ladronism. There was talk of
promiscuous burning in connection with General Smith. Let me tell you
what it really means when you can see it. The Eighteenth Regulars
marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz in the north of Panay, under
orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result
was they left a strip of land sixty miles wide from one end of the
island to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have
flown without provisions. That is what burning means, and no more.
American fury in the Philippines. XVIII / Lake Taal
"The trade conditions observable at Manila are merely a reflection of
what may be witnessed in the interior. A journey through the provinces
can not help giving a most discouraging impression. Many towns,
formerly well-built, were destroyed during the war. Churches are in
ruins;whole villages, here and there, lie waste.
The growth in the import of rice is attributed to 1)The almost total
loss of their farm animals (estimated officially at 90% due to the
war and rinderpest)
2)Injury done to the irrigation system during the
war
3)The scarcity of adult male labour as a result of the war. The
dispropotionate number of women and children consequent upon the war
is still noticeable...
...Notwithstanding that in the beginning many of the provinces were
organized as civil governments, it has been thought necessary now and
again to substitute them with a politico-military government, and
today at least six of the provinces are still organized on that basis.
Extreme military methods for controlling the population are provided
for by law and their application in certain cases authorized. Of
these the most marked is what is known as " reconcentration."
RECONCENTRATION: The use of this plan for reducing a population to
submission is authorized by section (i of the Commission's act No.781,
further organizing the constabulary, in the following words: "'In
provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory
raids, and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or
outlaws their source of food supply * * * it shall be within the
power of the civil governor, upon resolution of the Commission. to
authorize the provincial governor to order that the residents of
such outlying barrios be temporarily brought within stated proximity
to the poblacion or larger barrios."
It is a fact that no year has passed without the application of this
policy in a larger scale. In 1902 it was undertaken in the region
about Lake Taal, comprising parts of Laguna and Bat@ngas provinces. It
then affected not less than 100.000 people, according to the
report of Colonel Wagner, who inspected the camps...each of which
included from 8000 to 14ooo persons. During 1903 the same plan was
pursued in Albay, where very large areas were entirely deprived of
population, the inhabitants being herded in camps.
Besides the official application of the policy on a larger scale,
other instances have occurred. Several camps now exist in Cavite, and
not long since, reconcentration was tried in Tayagas, without
official authority, according to ex-governor Taft. It is beyond the
question, from the testimony both natives and Americans who are
conversant with the workings of reconcentration that its effects are
the most disastrous, causing widespread suffering. In the camps food
is distributed only when extreme want requires it. .... The lack of
house accommodations and the scarcity of food as well as the
overcrowding of the inmates of the camps have invariably caused much
increase in mortality. At the same time there has been a tremendous
loss of crops and houses throughout the districts in which
reconcentration has taken place...
It is the testimony of capable American lawyers in Manila that under
existing law it is entirely possible to convict any human being in
the archipelago of "bandolerismo" (the local name for membership in or
assistance to organized bands of insurrectionists), without regard
to guilt. That such conviction can be secured is, in fact, the open
boast of some constabulary officials...
How effective have been may be seen from the situation in the Bibilid
prison...The total number of persons confined August 31, 1903,on
charges of "aiding insurrection, conspiracy,highway robbery, illegal
custody of arms, rebellion, sedition, violation of oath of allegience,
violation on articles of war, and treason was 1093. On a recent date
the number of men confined in Bilibid who had been
sentenced and were awaiting capital punishment was 100.
. As General Davis mildly states the situation (Report, 190.3, p.31):
"Americans in the Philippines have not so far been an unmixed
blessing to the native inhabitants". We have, in fact, destroyed the
public buildings of the country, inflicted continuous crop losses
during a period of six years; ravaged and burned large sections of
territory; produced conditions leading to the death of most of the
farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics; brought
foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation;
inaugurated a tremendously expensive government for the benefit of
foreign officeholders; established a partisan judiciary; crowded the
prisons and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most
patriotic of the native leaders.
Senator E.W. Carmack, December 1904
what may be witnessed in the interior. A journey through the provinces
can not help giving a most discouraging impression. Many towns,
formerly well-built, were destroyed during the war. Churches are in
ruins;whole villages, here and there, lie waste.
The growth in the import of rice is attributed to 1)The almost total
loss of their farm animals (estimated officially at 90% due to the
war and rinderpest)
2)Injury done to the irrigation system during the
war
3)The scarcity of adult male labour as a result of the war. The
dispropotionate number of women and children consequent upon the war
is still noticeable...
...Notwithstanding that in the beginning many of the provinces were
organized as civil governments, it has been thought necessary now and
again to substitute them with a politico-military government, and
today at least six of the provinces are still organized on that basis.
Extreme military methods for controlling the population are provided
for by law and their application in certain cases authorized. Of
these the most marked is what is known as " reconcentration."
RECONCENTRATION: The use of this plan for reducing a population to
submission is authorized by section (i of the Commission's act No.781,
further organizing the constabulary, in the following words: "'In
provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory
raids, and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or
outlaws their source of food supply * * * it shall be within the
power of the civil governor, upon resolution of the Commission. to
authorize the provincial governor to order that the residents of
such outlying barrios be temporarily brought within stated proximity
to the poblacion or larger barrios."
It is a fact that no year has passed without the application of this
policy in a larger scale. In 1902 it was undertaken in the region
about Lake Taal, comprising parts of Laguna and Bat@ngas provinces. It
then affected not less than 100.000 people, according to the
report of Colonel Wagner, who inspected the camps...each of which
included from 8000 to 14ooo persons. During 1903 the same plan was
pursued in Albay, where very large areas were entirely deprived of
population, the inhabitants being herded in camps.
Besides the official application of the policy on a larger scale,
other instances have occurred. Several camps now exist in Cavite, and
not long since, reconcentration was tried in Tayagas, without
official authority, according to ex-governor Taft. It is beyond the
question, from the testimony both natives and Americans who are
conversant with the workings of reconcentration that its effects are
the most disastrous, causing widespread suffering. In the camps food
is distributed only when extreme want requires it. .... The lack of
house accommodations and the scarcity of food as well as the
overcrowding of the inmates of the camps have invariably caused much
increase in mortality. At the same time there has been a tremendous
loss of crops and houses throughout the districts in which
reconcentration has taken place...
It is the testimony of capable American lawyers in Manila that under
existing law it is entirely possible to convict any human being in
the archipelago of "bandolerismo" (the local name for membership in or
assistance to organized bands of insurrectionists), without regard
to guilt. That such conviction can be secured is, in fact, the open
boast of some constabulary officials...
How effective have been may be seen from the situation in the Bibilid
prison...The total number of persons confined August 31, 1903,on
charges of "aiding insurrection, conspiracy,highway robbery, illegal
custody of arms, rebellion, sedition, violation of oath of allegience,
violation on articles of war, and treason was 1093. On a recent date
the number of men confined in Bilibid who had been
sentenced and were awaiting capital punishment was 100.
. As General Davis mildly states the situation (Report, 190.3, p.31):
"Americans in the Philippines have not so far been an unmixed
blessing to the native inhabitants". We have, in fact, destroyed the
public buildings of the country, inflicted continuous crop losses
during a period of six years; ravaged and burned large sections of
territory; produced conditions leading to the death of most of the
farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics; brought
foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation;
inaugurated a tremendously expensive government for the benefit of
foreign officeholders; established a partisan judiciary; crowded the
prisons and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most
patriotic of the native leaders.
Senator E.W. Carmack, December 1904
American fury in the Philippines. XVII / Santa Cruz
" I have just returned to Santa Cruz from a two days' trip in tie
mountains. We left Santa Cruz about 4.30 on the morning of the 5th, and
proceeded about twenty miles into the mountains. Men from each troop
volunteered to walk five miles further to a house where, we were
informed, a Filipino general lived. Besides sixty men, we had two scouts
to show us the way. We sneaked through the bushes from place to place,
and when we had failed to find the house, or even see any native, we
became disgusted, and proceeded to return to Santa Cruz. Just as we were
about to turn back we heard a sound of laughter near us, and we started
ahead again, and creeping through the bushes, we came in sight of a
house. We saw a Filipino officer addressing a crowd of natives. In the
house a wedding ceremony was being performed, an insurgent officer
taking to himself a better half. During the speech the audience cried
out, ' Long live Aguinaldo!' We were about twenty-five yards from the
house when the word was given to charge, but not to shoot the clildren.
Most of the party had been indulging in wine, and were not sober. Each
soldier took aim, and rushed upon the crowd and fired. Those who escaped
took refuge in the building. On the ground near the house were the
bodies of the slain, and among them were the bridegroom and the bride,
both weltering in their blood."
Thomas Jones, 1900
mountains. We left Santa Cruz about 4.30 on the morning of the 5th, and
proceeded about twenty miles into the mountains. Men from each troop
volunteered to walk five miles further to a house where, we were
informed, a Filipino general lived. Besides sixty men, we had two scouts
to show us the way. We sneaked through the bushes from place to place,
and when we had failed to find the house, or even see any native, we
became disgusted, and proceeded to return to Santa Cruz. Just as we were
about to turn back we heard a sound of laughter near us, and we started
ahead again, and creeping through the bushes, we came in sight of a
house. We saw a Filipino officer addressing a crowd of natives. In the
house a wedding ceremony was being performed, an insurgent officer
taking to himself a better half. During the speech the audience cried
out, ' Long live Aguinaldo!' We were about twenty-five yards from the
house when the word was given to charge, but not to shoot the clildren.
Most of the party had been indulging in wine, and were not sober. Each
soldier took aim, and rushed upon the crowd and fired. Those who escaped
took refuge in the building. On the ground near the house were the
bodies of the slain, and among them were the bridegroom and the bride,
both weltering in their blood."
Thomas Jones, 1900
American fury in the Philippines. XVI / Negros, Albay
I stood on the spot in Negros where Montgomery, the superintendent of
education for that province, was killed. According to my information
it was an ordinary, highway murder for robbery, such as occurs
sometimes in my own city of Chicago. What was the punishment? The
constables were given free hand, the barrio was burned, men were
killed, some were tried and hanged, but the spirit was not that of
American law, but rather of a mob blindly avenging crime.
I drove through Albay Province, and I found 300,000 people
reconcentrated, hemp rotting in the fields, homes empty and not a human
being outside the lines — all punished because some 300 men are in the
mountains as ladrones or insurrectos.
David Jessup Doherty, 1904
education for that province, was killed. According to my information
it was an ordinary, highway murder for robbery, such as occurs
sometimes in my own city of Chicago. What was the punishment? The
constables were given free hand, the barrio was burned, men were
killed, some were tried and hanged, but the spirit was not that of
American law, but rather of a mob blindly avenging crime.
I drove through Albay Province, and I found 300,000 people
reconcentrated, hemp rotting in the fields, homes empty and not a human
being outside the lines — all punished because some 300 men are in the
mountains as ladrones or insurrectos.
David Jessup Doherty, 1904
American fury in the Philippines. XV / Plunder
E. D. Furnam, of the Washington Regiment, writes of the battles of
February 4th and 5th:
We burned hundreds of houses and looted hundreds more. Some of the
boys made good hauls of jewelry and clothing. Nearly every man has at
least two suits of clothing, and our quarters are furnished in style;
fine beds with silken drapery, mirrors, chairs, rockers, cushions,
pianos, hanging-lamps, rugs, pictures, etc. We have horses and
carriages, and bull-carts galore, and enough furniture and other
plunder to load a steamer.
February 4th and 5th:
We burned hundreds of houses and looted hundreds more. Some of the
boys made good hauls of jewelry and clothing. Nearly every man has at
least two suits of clothing, and our quarters are furnished in style;
fine beds with silken drapery, mirrors, chairs, rockers, cushions,
pianos, hanging-lamps, rugs, pictures, etc. We have horses and
carriages, and bull-carts galore, and enough furniture and other
plunder to load a steamer.
American fury in the Philippines. XIV / Mateo river
Fielding Lewis Poindexter, of the Second Oregon:
"About dark, before Company D's return, Colonel Summers rode over to
General Wheaton's headquarters. Shortly after reaching there reports,
which afterwards proved to be somewhat exaggerated, came in that two
companies of the Twenty-second Infantry had been literally cut to
pieces, having fallen into an ambush. After a hasty consultation it
was decided to proceed at once to kill or drive into the lake every
native possible to be found in the half-moon-shaped district lying
between the mouth of the Mateo river and the farther end of the lake,
a distance of twelve miles."
"About dark, before Company D's return, Colonel Summers rode over to
General Wheaton's headquarters. Shortly after reaching there reports,
which afterwards proved to be somewhat exaggerated, came in that two
companies of the Twenty-second Infantry had been literally cut to
pieces, having fallen into an ambush. After a hasty consultation it
was decided to proceed at once to kill or drive into the lake every
native possible to be found in the half-moon-shaped district lying
between the mouth of the Mateo river and the farther end of the lake,
a distance of twelve miles."
American fury in the Philippines. XIII / Mass murder
A Corporal in the California Regiment:
"We sleep all day here, as we do our duty all night, walking the
streets. We make every one get into his house by 7 P.M., and we only
tell a man once. If he refuses, we shoot him. We killed over three
hundred men the first night. They tried to set the town on fire. If
they fire a shot from a house, we burn the house down, and every house
near it, and shoot the natives; so they are pretty quiet in town now."
"We sleep all day here, as we do our duty all night, walking the
streets. We make every one get into his house by 7 P.M., and we only
tell a man once. If he refuses, we shoot him. We killed over three
hundred men the first night. They tried to set the town on fire. If
they fire a shot from a house, we burn the house down, and every house
near it, and shoot the natives; so they are pretty quiet in town now."
May 20, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. XII / Malabon
"We bombarded a place called Malabon, and then we went in and killed
every native we met, men, women, and children. It was a dreadful sight
the killing of those poor creatures. The natives captured some of the
Americans and literally hacked them to pieces, so we got orders to
spare no one."
--Anthony Michea, of the Third Artillery
every native we met, men, women, and children. It was a dreadful sight
the killing of those poor creatures. The natives captured some of the
Americans and literally hacked them to pieces, so we got orders to
spare no one."
--Anthony Michea, of the Third Artillery
American fury in the Philippines. XI / Mass murder
"When you can realize four hundred or five hundred persons living
within the confines of five or six blocks, and then an order calling
out all of the women and children, and then setting fire to houses and
shooting down any niggers attempting to escape from the flames, you
have an idea of Filipino warfare."
--Sergeant Will A. Rule, Co. H, Colorado Volunteers
within the confines of five or six blocks, and then an order calling
out all of the women and children, and then setting fire to houses and
shooting down any niggers attempting to escape from the flames, you
have an idea of Filipino warfare."
--Sergeant Will A. Rule, Co. H, Colorado Volunteers
American fury in the Philippines. X / Titatia
"The town of Titatia was surrendered to us a few days ago, and two
companies occupy the same. Last night one of our boys was found shot
and his stomach cut open. Immediately orders were received from
General Wheaton to burn the town and kill every native in sight, which
was done to a finish. About one thousand men, women, and children were
reported killed. I am probably growing hard-hearted, for I am in my
glory when I can sight my gun on some dark-skin and pull the trigger.
--A. A. Barnes, Battery G., Third United States Artillery
companies occupy the same. Last night one of our boys was found shot
and his stomach cut open. Immediately orders were received from
General Wheaton to burn the town and kill every native in sight, which
was done to a finish. About one thousand men, women, and children were
reported killed. I am probably growing hard-hearted, for I am in my
glory when I can sight my gun on some dark-skin and pull the trigger.
--A. A. Barnes, Battery G., Third United States Artillery
American fury in the Philippines. IX / Maypaja
Writing his own version of the Caloocan fight, Captain Elliot, of the
Kansas Regiment said:
Talk about war being "hell," this war beats the hottest estimate ever
made of that locality. Caloocan was supposed to contain seventeen
thousand inhabitants. The Twentieth Kansas swept through it, and now
Caloocan contains not one living native. Of the buildings, the
battered walls of the great church and dismal prison alone remain. The
village of Maypaja, where our first fight occurred on the night of the
fourth, had five thousand people on that day—now not one stone remains
upon top of another. You can only faintly imagine this terrible scene
of desolation. War is worse than hell.
Kansas Regiment said:
Talk about war being "hell," this war beats the hottest estimate ever
made of that locality. Caloocan was supposed to contain seventeen
thousand inhabitants. The Twentieth Kansas swept through it, and now
Caloocan contains not one living native. Of the buildings, the
battered walls of the great church and dismal prison alone remain. The
village of Maypaja, where our first fight occurred on the night of the
fourth, had five thousand people on that day—now not one stone remains
upon top of another. You can only faintly imagine this terrible scene
of desolation. War is worse than hell.
American fury in the Philippines. VIII / Igbaras
Senator RAWLINS. I will pass to another subject.
By Senator RAWLINS: Q. How large a town was this village of Igbaras?-
A. I do not know how many acres it covered.
Q. I do not mean how many acres, but about how many houses?-
A. From 400 to 5oo native shacks or bamboo houses.
Q. How long were you there after your arrival that morning?-
A. We were there until about 8 o'clock the next morning We were in the
immediate vicinity of the mountains back of the town. We-left there
between 8 and 8.30 the next morning.
Q. What was done with the town?-
A. After returning from the mountains the town was burned that night.
Q. By whose orders?-
A. By order of Captain Glenn.
Q. How many houses were destroyed?-
A. Practically the entire town, with the exception of the church, the
quarters of the soldiers, and about twenty or thirty houses in the
lower section of the town.
Q. How were those houses occupied?-
A. They were occupied by native families.
Q. Men, women, and children?-
A. Men, women, and children; yes, sir.
itle: Testimony of Charles S. Riley [and William Lewis Smith]:
Author: Riley, Charles S.
By Senator RAWLINS: Q. How large a town was this village of Igbaras?-
A. I do not know how many acres it covered.
Q. I do not mean how many acres, but about how many houses?-
A. From 400 to 5oo native shacks or bamboo houses.
Q. How long were you there after your arrival that morning?-
A. We were there until about 8 o'clock the next morning We were in the
immediate vicinity of the mountains back of the town. We-left there
between 8 and 8.30 the next morning.
Q. What was done with the town?-
A. After returning from the mountains the town was burned that night.
Q. By whose orders?-
A. By order of Captain Glenn.
Q. How many houses were destroyed?-
A. Practically the entire town, with the exception of the church, the
quarters of the soldiers, and about twenty or thirty houses in the
lower section of the town.
Q. How were those houses occupied?-
A. They were occupied by native families.
Q. Men, women, and children?-
A. Men, women, and children; yes, sir.
itle: Testimony of Charles S. Riley [and William Lewis Smith]:
Author: Riley, Charles S.
American fury in the Philippines. VI / Santa María
April 12, 1899-Nine companies under command of Colonel Summers, left
Bocaue at 5:45 A. M. and entered Santa Maria at 8:10; town burned.
Bocaue at 5:45 A. M. and entered Santa Maria at 8:10; town burned.
May 19, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. V / Taguig
Mar. 18, 1899-Company D sent to relief of company of Washington
regiment at Taguig; town captured and burned.
regiment at Taguig; town captured and burned.
May 18, 2008
American fury in the Philippines.IV / Mariquina
Mar. 7, 1899-Companies G and K engaged enemy near Mariquina and
dispersed them. Burned the town.
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATIONS OF THE
SECOND OREGON VOLUNTEER INFANTRY. Prepared by CAPT. W. S. GILBERT,
Regimental Chaplain and Historian.
dispersed them. Burned the town.
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATIONS OF THE
SECOND OREGON VOLUNTEER INFANTRY. Prepared by CAPT. W. S. GILBERT,
Regimental Chaplain and Historian.
American fury in the Philippines.III / Tondo
The line having been formed, the bugle sounded "Forward," and the
advance commenced. Firing began almost immediately and soon became
very warm. The Mausers could be heard on all sides, and it was
impossible to ascertain where the bullets came from, as smokeless
powder was being used by the enemy. Our men became a little nervous
under this flank fire, and we halted before we had proceeded more than
one hundred yards, the men taking refuge behind a stone wall. Seeing
that nothing could be done until this flank fire by the sharpshooters
had been stopped, and as it seemed to be coming from the native huts,
I sent out orders to burn all the huts, and to advance again, slowly,
burning the huts as we proceeded.
Report of Maj. Percy Willis, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer Infantry, of Pursuit of Insurgents in Tondo, February 23, 1899.
Title: The official records of the Oregon volunteers in the Spanish war and Philippine insurrection.
Author: Oregon. Adjutant-General's Office.
American fury in the Philippines. II / Caloocan
The line had advanced but a short distance when the enemy opened fire
on us from the nipa huts and from the trees. We returned the fire when
we could locate the enemy, but with very slight effect. As the line
advanced it became necessary to burn the native shacks to dislodge
the insurgents. This we did as we advanced, and in a very short time
the main body of insurgents was located in a stone inclosure and
behind breastworks of stone across the streets in front of my company.
A heavy fire was opened up by both sides, with telling effect on the
enemy. The insurgents behind the breastworks retreated to the stone
inclosure and continued the fighting until a flank attack by the right
of my company forced them to surrender. We killed thirty natives,
wounded nine, and took about twenty prisoners, all without a man of my
command killed or wounded. The fighting of the day, so far as my
company was concerned, ended here. I was ordered to deploy my men on
the left of the main road to Caloocan, but after advancing about one
fourth mile found the country impassable on account of water, and had
to return to the main road, which we followed until we reached the
stone bridge, beyond the car shops. Here we deployed on the right of
the Minnesotas, and, with Captain Davis's company on my right, we
continued on to Caloocan, burning all the native huts on the way.
J. M. POORMAN, Commanding Company M, Second Oregon, U. S. V.
on us from the nipa huts and from the trees. We returned the fire when
we could locate the enemy, but with very slight effect. As the line
advanced it became necessary to burn the native shacks to dislodge
the insurgents. This we did as we advanced, and in a very short time
the main body of insurgents was located in a stone inclosure and
behind breastworks of stone across the streets in front of my company.
A heavy fire was opened up by both sides, with telling effect on the
enemy. The insurgents behind the breastworks retreated to the stone
inclosure and continued the fighting until a flank attack by the right
of my company forced them to surrender. We killed thirty natives,
wounded nine, and took about twenty prisoners, all without a man of my
command killed or wounded. The fighting of the day, so far as my
company was concerned, ended here. I was ordered to deploy my men on
the left of the main road to Caloocan, but after advancing about one
fourth mile found the country impassable on account of water, and had
to return to the main road, which we followed until we reached the
stone bridge, beyond the car shops. Here we deployed on the right of
the Minnesotas, and, with Captain Davis's company on my right, we
continued on to Caloocan, burning all the native huts on the way.
J. M. POORMAN, Commanding Company M, Second Oregon, U. S. V.
May 17, 2008
American fury in the Philippines. I / Mariquina
Captain Worrick later took twenty men and dislodged a lot of
sharpshooters that had gathered a little over a mile north of the
Deposito. He had a brief engagement, in which his men saw several
victims of their excellent shooting, which terminated in the rout of
the enemy again. Another move on the Mariquina Road was made March 6th
by Captain Barber, aided by Lieutenant Murphy commanding one Hotchkiss
gun. The captain's men did not discover the enemy until close upon an
outpost in light trenches. The greeting was a few Mauser volleys at
very close range, which were fortunately without serious results to
the Americans. After arranging his men to meet these sharpshooters, a
rapid advance was commenced that bore the outpost back on the main
body. The Filipinos had a commanding position on a ridge beyond the
range of the Springfields. Company K, under Captain Worrick, was sent
to the aid of Company G. Lieutenant Murphy got his Hotchkiss in play,
with apparent effect on the Filipinos. They had begun to shrink from
the accurate fire, when the Hotchkiss broke down, so that it had to be
taken from the field as useless. The two companies then made a general
forward movement that culminated in defeat for their foes after eight
hours of successive fighting. Privates Eide and Stanton of Company G,
who had been detailed with one of the Gatling guns, tried to join the
command during the fighting and were both wounded. After resting a day
Companies G and K moved against Mariquina Village, dispersing all
opposition in that vicinity and burning what remained of that populous
place.
Title: The official records of the Oregon volunteers in the Spanish
war and Philippine insurrection,
Author: Oregon. Adjutant-General's Office.
sharpshooters that had gathered a little over a mile north of the
Deposito. He had a brief engagement, in which his men saw several
victims of their excellent shooting, which terminated in the rout of
the enemy again. Another move on the Mariquina Road was made March 6th
by Captain Barber, aided by Lieutenant Murphy commanding one Hotchkiss
gun. The captain's men did not discover the enemy until close upon an
outpost in light trenches. The greeting was a few Mauser volleys at
very close range, which were fortunately without serious results to
the Americans. After arranging his men to meet these sharpshooters, a
rapid advance was commenced that bore the outpost back on the main
body. The Filipinos had a commanding position on a ridge beyond the
range of the Springfields. Company K, under Captain Worrick, was sent
to the aid of Company G. Lieutenant Murphy got his Hotchkiss in play,
with apparent effect on the Filipinos. They had begun to shrink from
the accurate fire, when the Hotchkiss broke down, so that it had to be
taken from the field as useless. The two companies then made a general
forward movement that culminated in defeat for their foes after eight
hours of successive fighting. Privates Eide and Stanton of Company G,
who had been detailed with one of the Gatling guns, tried to join the
command during the fighting and were both wounded. After resting a day
Companies G and K moved against Mariquina Village, dispersing all
opposition in that vicinity and burning what remained of that populous
place.
Title: The official records of the Oregon volunteers in the Spanish
war and Philippine insurrection,
Author: Oregon. Adjutant-General's Office.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
